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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lee A. Ridgley appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether his attorney in the underlying criminal case was ineffective.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
In 2002, Mr. Ridgley pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under the age of
sixteen. (R., pp.3-4.) He then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied; the
ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p.35;
100.) Mr. Ridgley then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.3.)
In his petition, Mr. Ridgley asserted that his attorney was ineffective. (R., p.4.)
He stated that on February 10, 2002, his wife died due to complications with asthma
and that he was arrested on the lewd conduct charge shortly after her death. (R., p.4.)
He was emotionally distraught due to his wife's death and was severely depressed.
(R., p.4.) Even worse, there was speculation that he would be charged with murder for
his wife's death. (R., p.4.) Mr. Ridgley was "in complete emotion shut down and a state
of confusion." (R., p.4.) Due to his wife's death, Mr. Ridgley's children were "sheltered
by the ldaho Department of Health and Welfare" and he was going through both
criminal proceedings and civil child protection proceedings. (R., p.4.)
Mr. Ridgley asserted that his court-appointed attorney spent less than one hour
with him before he entered his guilty plea. (R., p.4.) He was never provided with the
police report, and his counsel, other than reading the police report, did not contact any

witnesses, did not watch any video or audiotapes, and did not listen to Mr. Ridgley when
Mr. Ridgley said that he was not understanding the other attorney's comments.
(R., p.4.) Mr. Ridgley told his attorney that he was suffering from depression and did
not understand what was transpiring in his cases but his attorney did not discuss any
potential defenses he had to the case. (R., p.4.)
Mr. Ridgley acknowledged that he signed a written plea of guilty, but he asserted
that he "was in such a state of shock and disbelief of the rush of what was going on, the
complete devastation of losing my wife and my family and within a three (3) week period
of time entering my guilty plea to the charge, I had expressed complete break down to
my attorney and I expressed that I was not mentally well." (R., p.4.) He also asserted
that his attorney did not advise him of the potential of having a mental health evaluation
or discuss whether or not he would be able to "appreciate the proceedings that were
filed against me or be able to assist in my defense." (R., p.4.)
Mr. Ridgley subsequently received a different lawyer, who filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.5.) Mr. Ridgley asserted that during the hearing on the
motion, his counsel admitted that he had not spent more than an hour with him, did not
know the names of anyone mentioned in the police report, that he never shared the
police report with him, had never watched any videotapes of interviews with the alleged
victim, did not listen to the audiotapes, did not conduct any independent investigation,
and never discussed the facts of the charge or explain any defenses that Mr. Ridgley
might have had. (R., p.5.) Counsel allegedly stated that Mr. Ridgley was under a lot of
stress and just wanted the charge to go away, which was the basis of entering into plea
negotiations. (R., p.5.)

The State responded and moved for summary dismissal. (R., p.14.) However,
the district court also issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.105.) The court noted
that the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea "factually
supports some of Petitioner's allegations," there was "nevertheless insufficient evidence
that the whole of counsel's representation of Petition was objectively unreasonable,
especially in light of Petitioner's indication at the time that he simply the wanted the
criminal matter over with. . . ." (R., p.108.) Further, the court held that, even if Mr.
Ridgley had established deficient representation, "there is a total lack of evidence that,
but for counsel's deficiencies, Petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. Even with
all the information Petitioner now has, he does not unequivocally state that he would
proceed to trial." (R., p.109.)
Mr. Ridgley submitted a response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss
and supplemented it with affidavits from himself and his post-conviction counsel and
with a report from Jonelle Timiin. (R., p.133.) Mr. Ridgley's affidavit stated that he told
his attorney that he was under severe depression and that he did not understand the
proceedings against him. (R., pp.112-123.) Further the affidavit averred that he told his
attorney that he had been seen by Tam Judy, a counselor at the Boundary County
Sheriff's Office, due to his depression and suicidal thoughts but that his attorney never
spoke to him about receiving a mental health evaluation or about understanding the
proceedings against him. ( R . p . 3 ) The affidavit also asserted that Mr. Ridgley was
asserting that he wanted to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. (R., p.114.)
Mr. Ridgley's post-conviction attorney, in his affidavit, asserted that he spoke with
the prosecutor's office, who informed him that tapes were available for review along with

the rest of the discovery that was picked up by Mr. Ridgley's initial attorney. The postconviction attorney also stated that, "had a client told me he was severely depressed
and suffered an emotional breakdown and had been seen by a psychologist due to
suicidal idealations and had been incarcerated the day after his wife's death . . . I would
have been seriously concerned about his mental status, and whether or not he could
understand the proceedings against him. . . ." (R., p.118-119.) Even if a client had told
him he wanted to plead just to get the case over with, he would have requested an
evaluation under I.C. § 18-210 before entering into plea negotiations. (R., p.119.) In
addition, he would have reviewed the police reports and tapes to be fully informed
before advising a client to plead guilty. (R., p.119.)
The district court was not persuaded. (R., p.152.) The court held that the
responses to the notice of intent to dismiss did not rectify the problems with the initial
petition.

(R., p.154.) The district court then discussed the effect of the Court of

Appeals' ruling that Mr. Ridgley had not supplied a just reason to withdraw his guilty
plea. (R., p.154.) The district court found that "the grounds and arguments asserted by
Ridgley during his appeal were virtual mirror images of the arguments he now states in
this action." (R., p.154.) The district court also found that the:
"only 'new' evidence submitted in support of the petition herein that was
not before the criminal trial judge is the Ridgley affidavit and the Hull [postconviction attorney] affidavit commenting on Ridgley's mental condition
and the failure of attorney Williams to advise Ridgley of, or to
independently request, a mental health evaluation."
(R., p.155.)

Further, while acknowledging that "the standard for an effective assistance of
counsel claim is different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea . . . this Court
finds the factual similarities of Ridgley's claims extraordinary. . . ." (R., p.155.)
Mr. Ridgley appealed. (R., p.165.) Mr. Ridgley asserts that the district court
erred by summarily dismissing his petition because he raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his counsel was ineffective and by dismissing on grounds
not set forth in the notice of intent to dismiss.

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Ridgley's petition for postconviction relief because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
his attorney was ineffective?

2.

Did the district court err by dismissing on grounds not set forth in the notice of
intent to dismiss?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred Bv Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Ridalev's Petition For PostConviction Relief Because He Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact As To Whether
His Attorney Was lneffective
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ridgley asserts that, contrary to the district court's conclusions, that he raised

a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat sua sponfe dismissal in this case.
B.

The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissina Mr. Ridqlev's Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Because He Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact As
To Whether His Attorney Was lneffective
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and

distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction.
Peltier v. State, 119 ldaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding
governed by the UPCPA and the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 ldaho at
456, 808 P.2d at 375. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 ldaho 813, 816,
892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995).
However, the petition initiating a post-conviction proceeding differs from the
complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to include more
than "a short and plain statement of the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such
supporting evidence is not attached."

Id.; I.C.

3 19-4903. "In other words, the

application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 ldaho
327, 331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998).
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. § 194906(c).' In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district court
need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 126 ldaho at 81617, 892 P.2d at 492-492. However, if the petitioner presents any evidentiary support for
his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least
until such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 ldaho 643,
646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on
their face. Id. Thus, only after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the
district court consider the evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 ldaho 612, 651 P.2d 546
(Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must still liberally construe the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at
1155.

If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155.

1

Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(c), which deals with motions for summary
disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals under section 19-4906(b) as well. See, e.g.,
Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under
section 19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of material fact has been presented).

If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte. I.C. 3 19-4906(c).
If the district court orders dismissal sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner
twenty days' notice and allow the petitioner to respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b).
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the
decision before it is finalized. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 ldaho 156, 159-160, 715 P.2d
369, 371-372 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, this requirement is strict; it makes no difference
whether the petitioner's claims are meritorious or not. Cherniwchan v. State, 99 ldaho
128, 129-30, 578 P.2d 244, 245-246 (1978). Moreover, vague notice of the district
court's intent to dismiss is insufficient. The district court must be specific as to the basis
for the intended dismissal so as to provide the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity
to respond. Banks v. State, 123 ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). If the district
court fails to give the petitioner the required notice and opportunity to respond, or if the
district court's notice is impermissibly vague, the petition must be reinstated. Peltier,
119 ldaho at 456-457, 458, 808 P.2d at 375-376, 377 (failure to give any notice); Banks,
123 ldaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39 (notice was impermissibly vague).
In its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court identified only two reasons for
its intent to dismiss:

1) that "the Court cannot find on this record that counsel's

representation of Petitioner was objectively unreasonable;" and 2) "even assuming
deficient representation, there is a total lack of evidence that, but for counsel's alleged
deficiencies, Petitioner would have insisted on going to trial." (R., p.109.)
The standard for evaluation of ineffective assistance claims was recently
summarized in State v. McKeeth, 140 ldaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004):

The test for determining whether a defendant has received effective
assistance of counsel is the two-part test established by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
State v. Mathews, 133 ldaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). The
first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that
counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The
second prong requires the defendant to "show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." Id. In determining whether a
defendant was deprived of reasonably competent assistance of counsel
as guaranteed by the ldaho Constitution, article 1, section 13, ldaho courts
employ the same two-part test. Mathews, 133 ldaho at 306, 986 P.2d at
329; Aragon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77
(I
988).

Id.
This test has been specifically applied in cases such as this one: where the
petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for giving bad legal advice and thereby
inducing the petitioner to plead guilty. See generally McKeeth.
As to the first prong of the Strickland test, the ldaho courts have held that the
attorney's performance is deficient if it "falls 'outside the wide range of professional
norms."' McKeeth, 140 ldaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463 (quoting Mathews, 133 ldaho at
306, 986 P.2d at 329). As to the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner is
prejudiced if his "counsel's deficient performance 'affected the outcome of the plea
process."' McKeeth, 140 ldaho at 851, 103 P.3d at 464 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). He need not show that he would have prevailed at trial. McKeeth,
140 ldaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465.
In this case, in the notice of intent to dismiss, the district court held, "the Court
cannot find on this record that counsel's representation of Petitioner was objectively
unreasonable." (R., p.109.) This is an incorrect standard. At the summary dismissal
stage,

Mr. Ridgley is not required to prove that he is entitled to post-conviction relief;

rather, he need only raise a genuine issue of material fact. I.G. § 19-4906. In this case,
he raised such an issue.
Mr. Ridgley's complaints against his trial attorney are summarized above, and
even the district court admitted that many of his allegations were supported by evidence
in the record, stating:
the transcript of the hearing on Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea
factually supports some of Petitioner's allegations, e.g., that counsel spent
approximately one hour personally with Petitioner prior to entry of the
guilty plea, that counsel did not provide Petitioner with a copy of the police
report, and that counsel did not review the audio and video tapes of the
interview of the alleged victim.
(R., p.108.) Based on this statement alone, Mr. Ridgley should have survived summary
dismissal

-

he made specific allegations of how his counsel was deficient and these

allegations were supported by the record.

However, the district court found this

evidence to be "insufficient that the whole of counsel's representation of Petitioner was
objectively reasonable, especially in light of Petitioner's indication that he simply wanted
the criminal matter over with. . . ." and then focused on the attorney's testimony in the
underlying criminal case wherein he testified that Mr. Ridgley was aware of the benefits
of the plea bargain and that he was adequately advised. (R., p.108.) However, the
district court was improperly weighing the evidence - balancing Mr. Ridgley's evidence
against the testimony of his attorney, and concluding that is could not find the attorney's
representation unreasonable
Further, the other alleged inadequacies addressed by the district court were
remedied by Mr. Ridgley's response to the notice of intent to dismiss. The court noted
that there was no evidence that any tapes were actually available for review.
(R., p.109.) In his affidavit, Mr. Ridgley's post-conviction attorney asserted that he

spoke with the prosecutor's office, who informed him that tapes were in fact available for
review. ( R p . 8 ) The district court also noted that there was no evidence that
Mr. Ridgley told his attorney that he was severely depressed and did not understand the
proceedings; Mr. Ridgley's affidavit specifically asserted that he told his counsel these
things. (R., pp.109; 112-113.)
Mr. Ridgley specifically alleged how counsel was ineffective, and, even according
to the district court, these allegations were supported by the record. While the district
court may have believed that counsel's representation as a whole was sufficient, the
district court was applying the wrong standard - the only requirement necessary to
defeat summary dismissal is that the petitioner raise a genuine issue of material fact,
and by supplying specific, supported, allegations of deficient performance, Mr. Ridgley
presented evidence to overcome a sua sponte dismissal. The district court improperly
dismissed Mr. Ridgley's petition on this basis.
Also, the district court concluded that, "even assuming deficient representation,
there is a total lack of evidence that, but for counsel's deficiencies, Petitioner would
have insisted on going to trial." (R., p.109.) This assertion is specifically rebutted in
Mr. Ridgley's affidavit in response to the notice of intent to dismiss. In the affidavit,
Mr. Ridgley repeatedly says that it was his intent to go to trial, stating, "[ilf I am
successful in my Post Conviction Relief, I will go to trial as I am not guilty of the
allegations charged against me by the State." ( R p . 3 ) Later in the affidavit, he
avers, "I am not guilty of the charged offenses and intend to fully go to trial should this
court grant my post conviction for relief" and that, "[ilt is not my intent to negotiate any of
the charges which would result in me pleading guilty."

( R p.4)

Mr. Ridgley

specifically asserted that he was not guilty of the charge and would insist on taking the
case to trial.
In the ordering dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district court
also relied heavily on the fact that Mr. Ridgley had filed a motion to withdraw his plea in
the underlying criminal case and that the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of this
motion.'

(R., p.154.) The court noted that the "grounds and arguments asserted by

Ridgley during the appeal were virtual mirror images of the arguments he now states in
this action." (R., p.154.) The court acknowledged that the "standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . is different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but
nonetheless this Court finds the factual similarities of Ridgley's claims extraordinary,
particularly on those issues where the evidence before this Court is no different than the
evidence before the criminal trial judge." (R., p.155.) The Court of Appeals' Opinion
affirming the denial of Mr. Ridgley's motion is in the record in this case. (R., pp.100104.)
Based on the findings made by the trial court in the motion to withdraw the plea,
which was affirmed on appeal, the district court held that, "this Court cannot find that the
attorney . . . failed to offer an objectively reasonable level of representation."
(R., p.156.) Further, the court noted that the allegations of depression and confusion
were not presented to the court in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in the
underlying criminal case, where Mr. Ridgley was represented by the same attorney who
represented him in the instant action. (R., p.155-157.)

Mr. Ridgley also asserts that it was error for the district court to be considering the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea at all, and this claim is addressed in Issue II.

13

Post-conviction relief is available where "there exists evidence of material facts,
not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence
in the interest of justice." I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) (emphasis added). A post-conviction
action is not a substitute for and does not supplant a direct appeal from the conviction or
sentence. I.C. § 19-4901(b); Paradis

v. State,

110 ldaho 534, 537, 716 P.2d 1306,

1309. Therefore, "[a] convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the same factual
questions in his application, in virtually the same factual context already presented in a
direct appeal." Whitehawk v. State, 116 ldaho 831, 833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (1989).
While in this case Mr. Ridgley is relying on many of the same facts set forth in his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he is not simply relitigating previous-heard issues.
As the district court itself noted, the "standard for ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is
different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. . . ." (R., p.155.) The district
court was correct in this regard; a motion to withdraw a guilty plea invokes the discretion
of the district court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Acevedo, 131 ldaho 513, 516, 960 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1998).
A petition for post-conviction relief is not left to the district court's discretion; if a
defendant raises a genuine issue of material fact, the district court is required to conduct
an evidentiary hearing. On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application
without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits
on file and liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997).
The abuse of discretion standard does not apply.

Therefore, in the instant case, as opposed to the motion to withdraw the plea, the
facts and inferences are construed in favor of Mr. Ridgley.

Therefore, it was

inappropriate for the district court to hold that, since many of the facts surrounding
Mr. Ridgley's representation were presented to the trial court and resolved against him,
that the facts could be resolved against him in the instant case particularly where a
vastly different standard of review applied in the previous case. Furthermore, the issue
in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was whether Mr. Ridgley was adequately
informed of the nature of the charge against him; the issue in this case is whether
Mr. Ridgley's attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately review
the file and discuss Mr. Ridgley's options with him.
The district court also largely discounted the claim that Mr. Ridgley was suffering
from severe depression and did not understand the proceedings because Mr. Hull, who
represented Mr. Ridgley in both the instant case and in the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, did not raise the issue in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R., p.157.) The
court noted that Mr. Hull did not request a mental health evaluation at the time of the
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. (R., p.157.)
Here again, the district court is resolving inferences against Mr. Ridgley when it
should be resolving them in his favor.

The district court's concerns illustrate that

Mr. Ridgley perhaps had another claim of ineffective assistance for counsel's
representation during the motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but they do not supply a
reason to draw inferences against him. Mr. Ridgley provided new information to the
district court, both in his and Mr. Hull's affidavits, and the Timlin report attached to
Mr. Hull's supplemental affidavit.

The District Court Erred Bv Sua Sponte Dismissina The Petition On Grounds Not Set
Forth In The Notice Of lntent To Dismiss

A.

Introduction
Because the notice of intent to dismiss did not address any issues relating to

Mr. Ridgley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he asserts that it was improper for the
district court to rely on that motion in sua sponte dismissing the petition.
B.

The District Court Erred Bv Sua Sponte Dismissina The Petition On Grounds Not
Set Forth In The Notice Of Intent To Dismiss
The district court may not summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief

without first providing an applicant with adequate notice of its reasons for dismissal.
Downing v. State, 132 ldaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999). The
district court must identify with particularity why an applicant's evidence or legal theories
are considered deficient. Id. at 864, 979 P.2d at 1222. The district court must give
notice of any deficiency in the applicant's evidence or any legal analysis that he needs
to address in order to avoid dismissal of his petition. Martinez v. State, 126 ldaho 813,
818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1995). The district court may only dismiss a petition
based on the rational articulated in the notice provided. Id. at 817-818, 892 P.2d at 49293.

"The statutory duty to specify the reasons for the proposed dismissal under

I.C. 3 19- 4906(b) rests solely with the district court and it is the district court alone who
is responsible for drafting the notice of intent to dismiss." Crabtree v. State, 144 ldaho
489, -,

163 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Downing v. State, 132 ldaho 861,

864, 979 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999)). "The state's motion to dismiss cannot . . .

be invoked by the state to cure any deficiencies in the district court's notice of intent
issued pursuant to I.C. 9 19-4906(b)." Id.
In the ordering dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district court
relied heavily on the fact that Mr. Ridgley had filed a motion to withdraw his plea in the
underlying criminal case and that the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of this
motion. (R., p.154.) The court noted that the "grounds and arguments asserted by
Ridgley during the appeal were virtual mirror images of the arguments he now states in
this action." (R., p.154.) The court acknowledged that the "standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . is different than that for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but
nonetheless this Court finds the factual similarities of Ridgley's claims extraordinary,
particularly on those issues where the evidence before this Court is no different than the
evidence before the criminal trial judge." (R., p.155.)
The district court's notice of intent to dismiss omits any mention of Mr. Ridgley's
motion to withdraw his plea. As such, Mr. Ridgley was never put on notice that he had
to persuade the district court that his current action was different or that the district
court's or Court of Appeals' findings should not be used against him. Mr. Ridgley was
put on notice only that the district court believed that he had failed to present sufficient
evidence that counsel's performance was deficient or that he had been prejudiced.
Therefore, it was improper for the district court to analogize the instant case to his
motion in the criminal case.
Mr. Ridgley acknowledges that the State's motion for summary dismissal did
assert that his current claims were foreclosed by the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
(R., pp.19-21.) However, the district court never addressed the State's motion, it WAS

proceeding solely upon the notice of intent to dismiss, and the "state's motion to dismiss
cannot . . . be invoked by the state to cure any deficiencies in the district court's notice
of intent issued pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b)." Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, -,
163 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, the State may not rely on the motion
for summary dismissal; the focus is solely on the notice of intent to dismiss, which does
not address the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at all. The district court's order must
therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ridgley respectfully requests that the district court's order dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
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